Central Asia's prehistory was shaped by the arrival of Scythian nomads, Iranian-speaking peoples from the northern Kazakh grasslands, during the first millennium BCE. They introduced irrigation systems along the region's rivers, laying the foundation for agricultural development. This led to the emergence of cities such as Bukhara and Samarkand, which became centers of governance and culture. Over time, these settlements flourished as critical hubs along the Silk Road, facilitating trade between China and Europe and bringing immense wealth to the region.

The region's Bronze Age heritage is evident in archaeological sites like Sarazm in Tajikistan, dating to the 4th millennium BCE, and Kök Tepe in Uzbekistan from the 15th century BCE.^[1] These settlements indicate an early urban culture that laid the groundwork for the development of Sogdiana and other civilizations that thrived in the fertile and strategically important landscapes of Central Asia.

During the Achaemenid period (550–330 BCE), the territory of modern Uzbekistan, particularly Sogdiana, became a part of the Persian Empire under Cyrus the Great during his Central Asian campaigns (546–539 BCE). The region's integration into the empire is mentioned by Herodotus and reflected in the Behistun Inscription of Darius I, who introduced administrative reforms like the Aramaic writing system and coin currency. The Sogdians were incorporated into the Achaemenid military, serving as soldiers and cavalry, and contributed luxury goods like lapis lazuli and carnelian to royal Persian construction projects, such as the palace at Susa.

The Achaemenid Empire at its greatest territorial extent, under the rule of Darius the Great (522–486 BC). © Cattette

Governed as part of the satrapy of Bactria, Sogdiana did not have a named satrap of its own, indicating its administrative linkage with nearby provinces. The period also saw the arrival of a significant Greek population, relocated as part of the Persian policy of dispersing rebellious groups to distant regions of the empire. Despite being a part of the Achaemenid realm, Sogdiana retained a nomadic and trade-oriented culture, with some groups transitioning to settled agriculture.

After the weakening of Achaemenid control during the reign of Artaxerxes II (c. 400 BCE), Sogdiana gained independence but avoided forming a centralized empire. It remained so until it was conquered by Alexander the Great in 329 BCE, marking a transition from Persian to Hellenistic influence. This era laid foundational elements for the region's later prominence as a key cultural and trade hub.

Following the fall of the Achaemenid Empire, Sogdiana, a now fiercely independent region, played a pivotal role in the events that reshaped Central Asia. Initially led by Bessus, the satrap of nearby Bactria, Sogdiana became a contested frontier territory. Bessus proclaimed himself the rightful successor to Darius III, whom he had betrayed and assassinated during the Persian retreat from Alexander the Great's advancing forces. However, Alexander pursued and captured Bessus, who was executed for his treachery.

In 327 BCE, Alexander targeted the Sogdian Rock, a seemingly impregnable fortress where Oxyartes, a Sogdian noble, had taken refuge with his daughter, Roxana. Despite its formidable defenses, Alexander's forces captured the stronghold. Soon after, Alexander married Roxana, likely to secure Sogdian loyalty. Their union produced Alexander IV, heir to the Macedonian throne, although his rule was short-lived, as Alexander's empire fractured in the subsequent Wars of the Diadochi.

Sogdiana, united with Bactria into a single satrapy under Alexander, became a center of both resistance and Hellenistic integration. The warlord Spitamenes, in alliance with Scythian tribes, led a prolonged uprising against Alexander's occupation. His insurgency was ultimately crushed by Alexander and his generals with the aid of local Bactrian and Sogdian forces. Spitamenes’ defeat marked the end of significant resistance, further cemented by his betrayal and execution. To stabilize the region, Alexander encouraged his men to intermarry with Sogdian women. This policy included high-profile unions like that of Apama, daughter of Spitamenes, who married Seleucus I Nicator, later founding cities in her name.

After Alexander's death, Sogdiana became part of the Hellenistic Greco-Bactrian Kingdom, a splinter state of the Seleucid Empire established by Diodotus I in 248 BCE. During this period, Sogdiana's influence waned, though it remained significant as a cultural and economic hub. Rivalries, such as those between Euthydemus I, a former satrap, and other claimants, underscored its strategic importance. Coins from this era bearing local Aramaic inscriptions reflect the blending of Greek and Sogdian cultural elements.

Sogdiana’s military strength never recovered to its former heights, but its legacy persisted, forming a bridge between Hellenistic and later Central Asian civilizations.

During the Greco-Bactrian period, the territory now known as Uzbekistan became a cultural and political crossroads in Central Asia. This era began when Diodotus I, the Seleucid satrap of Bactria and Sogdiana, declared independence around 250 BCE and founded the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom. Renowned as one of the wealthiest regions in the ancient world, the kingdom leveraged its position along the Silk Road to foster extensive trade with neighboring civilizations, including India, China, and the Mediterranean.

Early Greco-Bactrian Rule and Expansion

Diodotus I and his successors expanded the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom both territorially and economically. The kingdom's capital at Bactra (modern Balkh) and its urban centers like Alexandria Eschate (modern Khojand) in Sogdiana became hubs of Hellenistic culture, blending Greek influences with local traditions. Coins minted in this period reflect the fusion of Greek and local symbols, highlighting Bactria’s multicultural identity. Despite its early prosperity, the kingdom faced challenges from internal divisions and the rising Parthian Empire, which severed its connection to the broader Hellenistic world.

Euthydemid Dynasty and Regional Stability

The Euthydemid dynasty, founded by Euthydemus I, solidified the Greco-Bactrian hold over Sogdiana and expanded their influence to the Iaxartes River (Syr Darya). Euthydemus successfully resisted a three-year siege by Antiochus III of the Seleucid Empire, earning recognition of his rule. Under his son Demetrius I, the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom launched ambitious campaigns into the Indian subcontinent, establishing the Indo-Greek Kingdom, which blended Greek and Buddhist traditions and contributed to the development of Greco-Buddhism.

Eucratides and Decline

Internal conflicts weakened the kingdom, culminating in the rise of Eucratides I, who overthrew the Euthydemid dynasty around 170 BCE. Eucratides expanded westward into Parthian territories and eastward into northern India but faced persistent resistance, including an invasion by Indo-Greek forces under Demetrius II. Although successful in some campaigns, Eucratides was ultimately betrayed and killed by his own son, reflecting the kingdom's fractious state.

Nomadic Invasions and the Fall of Bactria

By the mid-2nd century BCE, the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom faced invasions from nomadic groups such as the Yuezhi and the Saka. The Yuezhi, displaced from their homeland in the Hexi Corridor by the Xiongnu, migrated to the Oxus region and expelled the Greeks from Bactria around 120 BCE. Heliocles I, the last Greco-Bactrian king, retreated to the Kabul Valley, marking the end of Greek rule in the region. Despite this, remnants of Greek influence persisted, as seen in the continued use of Greek coinage and the adoption of Greek letters by the Yuezhi for their court language.

The Greco-Bactrian era significantly shaped the cultural and economic landscape of Uzbekistan. It left a lasting legacy of Hellenistic urbanism, art, and coinage, while fostering cross-cultural exchanges through the Silk Road. The eventual rise of the Kushan Empire, rooted in the Yuezhi's occupation of Bactria, carried forward the traditions of Greek governance and artistic influence into a new era of Central Asian history.

By the mid-2nd century BCE, Sogdia and Bactria (modern-day Uzbekistan and surrounding regions) fell under the sway of the Sakas, a nomadic group driven westward by the Yuezhi, themselves displaced by the Xiongnu. These migrations ended the dominance of the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom and marked a new era of nomadic control over the region. The Sakas introduced their distinct cultural elements while adopting some Hellenistic influences that lingered from the Greco-Bactrians. By 145 BCE, the Yuezhi established themselves in Transoxiana, with their early coinage imitating those of the Greco-Bactrian kings Eucratides I and Heliocles I, a testament to cultural continuity amid political upheaval.

Kushan Era in Uzbekistan

The Yuezhi transitioned from nomadic chieftains to rulers of the Kushan Empire, which emerged by the 1st century CE and dominated much of Central Asia, including Uzbekistan. Bactria (southern Uzbekistan) became a core region of the empire, playing a vital role in its administration and culture. The Kushans connected Uzbekistan to a vast network of trade routes, enabling the flourishing of commerce and culture along the Silk Road.

Under the Kushan rulers, Uzbekistan saw significant urban and economic growth. Cities like Termez, Samarkand, and Bukhara thrived as trade hubs, connecting India, China, and the Mediterranean world. The Kushans minted coins depicting their rulers and diverse deities, demonstrating the syncretic blend of Greek, Indian, and Central Asian cultural influences in the region.

Spread of Buddhism and the Silk Road

The Kushan Empire was instrumental in introducing Buddhism to Uzbekistan. The empire’s rulers, particularly Kanishka the Great, were ardent patrons of Buddhism, fostering its transmission along the Silk Road. By the 1st and 2nd centuries CE, Buddhist missionaries traveled through the Kushan domains, establishing monasteries and stupas in Bactria and Sogdia, the southern regions of modern Uzbekistan. These served as centers of learning and spirituality.

The Silk Road amplified these exchanges, with Uzbekistan acting as a crucial corridor. Buddhist texts, artifacts, and ideas traveled along these routes, bridging India, Central Asia, and China. The Chinese monk Zhang Qian, who visited the Yuezhi in 126 BCE, described the region’s strategic importance and its role in facilitating cultural and religious interactions. Through the Kushans, Mahāyāna Buddhism entered China and beyond, with translations of Buddhist scriptures by monks like Lokaksema first appearing in the Chinese court.

Sogdia’s Role

Sogdian merchants were pivotal in the Silk Road’s success. Based in Uzbekistan, they facilitated the movement of goods, including silk, spices, and religious texts, across vast distances. They also served as cultural intermediaries, spreading Buddhist art and iconography into China and shaping the visual and spiritual landscape of early Chinese Buddhism.

Decline of the Kushans and Legacy

By the 3rd century CE, the Kushan Empire waned as Sasanian Persia and rising nomadic powers eroded its influence. However, its impact on Uzbekistan endured. The introduction of Buddhism, the flourishing of trade, and the synthesis of diverse cultures during the Kushan period left an indelible mark on the region’s identity. The legacy of this era can still be seen in Uzbekistan’s rich archaeological heritage, including Buddhist sites like Kara Tepe near Termez.

Uzbekistan’s role as a crossroads of civilizations, especially during the Saka and Kushan periods, positioned it as a vital cultural and religious bridge in the ancient world.

During the Parthian Empire (247 BCE–224 CE), historical records about Sogdia are sparse, reflecting a period of limited direct Persian administration over the region. While nominally part of the broader Parthian sphere, Sogdia remained semi-autonomous and likely maintained its strong trade networks and urban centers like Samarkand and Bukhara, serving as hubs on the Silk Road. Parthian influence would have primarily manifested through trade and cultural exchanges rather than stringent political control. The Sogdians were also adherents of Manichaeism, the faith founded by Mani, which they played a significant role in spreading among the Uyghurs.

Incorporation into the Sasanian Empire

The rise of the Sasanian Empire in Persia brought more direct involvement in Sogdia. By 260 CE, during the reign of Shapur I, Sogdia became a satrapy of the Sasanians. Shapur I’s inscriptions claim dominion over "Sogdia, to the mountains of Tashkent," marking the northeastern border of the empire and its frontier with the Kushan Empire. This strategic incorporation signified the importance of Sogdia as a buffer zone against nomadic incursions and a key economic region for controlling the Silk Road trade.

Sasanian governance likely reinforced the Zoroastrian influence in the region, alongside the existing local religious and cultural traditions. However, Sogdian cities retained a degree of autonomy, flourishing as trade centers and maintaining their distinct identity within the larger imperial framework.

Hephthalite Conquest

By the 5th century CE, the Hephthalites, a nomadic confederation also known as the White Huns, conquered Sogdia, marking the decline of Sasanian control over the region. This transition reflected the shifting balance of power in Central Asia, as nomadic groups increasingly asserted dominance over sedentary empires. Despite these changes, Sogdia remained an integral part of the Silk Road, facilitating commerce and cultural exchanges under successive rulers.

The Hephthalite Empire incorporated Sogdiana into its dominion around 479 CE, marking a significant shift in the region's history. This date coincides with the last known independent embassy of the Sogdians to China, signaling their subjugation. Alternatively, some sources suggest the conquest may have occurred later, around 509 CE, with evidence of continued Sogdian diplomatic activity under Hephthalite oversight until 522 CE. The Hephthalite ruler Akhshunwar, who defeated Sasanian Emperor Peroz I, bore a title possibly of Sogdian origin, highlighting the integration of Sogdian culture into the Hephthalite administration.

Urban Development and Governance

The Hephthalites likely continued and expanded the city-building traditions of their predecessors, such as the Kidarites. They are credited with constructing major Hippodamian-style cities, characterized by rectangular walls and orthogonal street networks, in key Sogdian centers like Bukhara and Panjikent, mirroring efforts in Herat. Governance under the Hephthalites was likely a confederation model, with local rulers or governors linked through alliances. One such vassal, Asbar, ruled Vardanzi and minted his own coinage, showcasing a degree of regional autonomy under Hephthalite suzerainty.

Economic Prosperity and the Silk Road

Sogdiana's central position on the Silk Road flourished under Hephthalite dominance. The wealth accrued from Sasanian ransoms and tributes was reinvested in the region, fostering economic prosperity. The Hephthalites acted as key intermediaries in the Silk Road trade, succeeding the Kushans, and engaged local Sogdians to manage the lucrative exchange of silk and luxury goods between the Chinese Empire, the Sasanian Empire, and the Byzantine Empire. This strategic role solidified Sogdiana's reputation as a prosperous and vital commercial hub.

Coinage and Cultural Influence

The Hephthalite occupation introduced a significant influx of Sasanian coinage into Sogdiana, as tributes from Persia flowed into the region. These coins circulated widely along the Silk Road, blending with local monetary traditions. Symbols of Hephthalite rule became prominent on Sogdian coinage from 500 to 700 CE, extending to their successors, the Ikhshids (642–755 CE), before the Muslim conquest of Transoxiana.

The Hephthalite period left an enduring legacy in Sogdiana, characterized by urbanization, economic prosperity, and integration into broader regional trade and cultural exchanges, positioning the region as a dynamic crossroads of Central Asia.

Following their defeat at the hands of a Turkic-Sasanian alliance in the Battle of Bukhara around 557 CE, the Hephthalite Empire collapsed, and Sogdia was divided between its victors. The Turks of the First Turkic Khaganate gained control of the region north of the Oxus, including all of Sogdia, while the Sasanians secured territories to the south. This division placed Sogdia firmly under Turkic influence and introduced new dynamics to the region's already vibrant trade and cultural exchange.

Rise of the Western Turkic Khaganate

After the fragmentation of the First Turkic Khaganate in 581 CE, Sogdia came under the sway of the Western Turkic Khaganate, which continued to foster Sogdiana's position as a crucial hub on the Silk Road. Archaeological evidence, such as the tomb of the Sogdian trader An Jia, suggests that the Turks became Sogdia’s primary trading partners. This relationship likely helped sustain Sogdia’s economic prosperity and its prominent role in Silk Road commerce.

A Cosmopolitan Society

The Afrasiab murals of Samarkand, dated to the 7th century, vividly portray Sogdia as a thriving, cosmopolitan society. In these murals, Turks are prominently depicted, attending receptions hosted by Sogdian rulers such as Varkhuman. Alongside the Turks, the murals also depict delegations from China, Korea, and other regions, reflecting Sogdia’s central position in a web of intercultural exchange that spanned from East Asia to the Mediterranean.

Under Turkic and later Chinese influence, Sogdia remained a dynamic center of trade, cultural exchange, and diplomacy. The close ties between Sogdians and the Turks not only ensured economic prosperity but also solidified Sogdia’s role as a bridge between the East and the West during a pivotal era of Silk Road history.

Under the Tang dynasty, Sogdia became a crucial part of China's Anxi Protectorate, established to oversee Central Asia and maintain control over key trade routes along the Silk Road. Beginning around 650 CE, the Tang-led conquest of the Western Turks brought Sogdian rulers, such as Varkhuman, under nominal Chinese suzerainty. This era marked a period of relative stability and prosperity for Sogdia, as it benefitted from Tang governance and protection, which facilitated the flourishing of trade, cultural exchange, and diplomacy.

Sogdia's cosmopolitan cities, like Samarkand, thrived under Tang influence, attracting diverse traders and envoys from across Asia. Tang records and Sogdian artifacts, such as the Afrasiab murals, depict a vibrant mix of Chinese, Turkic, Sogdian, and other cultures interacting within this system. This period of Chinese oversight continued until the Muslim conquest of Transoxiana in the mid-8th century, which ended Tang dominance in the region and ushered in a new Islamic era for Sogdia.

The Muslim conquest of Transoxiana marked a pivotal chapter in Central Asian history, as Arab forces gradually absorbed the region, including Sogdia, into the expanding Islamic Caliphate. This transformation unfolded over several centuries, marked by resistance, negotiation, and eventual cultural and religious assimilation.

Early Incursions and the Conquest of Sogdia

Following the Muslim conquest of Persia (651 CE), the Rashidun Caliphate's reach extended to Khorasan, bringing them to the banks of the Oxus River (Amu Darya). However, serious efforts to cross into Transoxiana and conquer its independent principalities began under the Umayyad Caliphate. These campaigns were driven by the region’s strategic importance, its wealth, and its role in controlling Silk Road trade routes.

Transoxiana, known as "the land beyond the river" to the Arabs, was divided into regions like Tokharistan, Sogdia, and Khwarizm. Sogdia, with its urban centers like Samarkand and Bukhara, was a vital hub of commerce and culture. Initially, Arab incursions were limited to raids for booty and tribute. However, the campaigns intensified under governors like Qutayba ibn Muslim, who in the early 8th century led a systematic conquest.

Qutayba captured major cities, including Samarkand and Bukhara, though not without difficulty. Sogdian rulers, like Tarkhun of Samarkand, often sought alliances with neighboring powers, including the Turks and the Tang dynasty of China, to resist Arab domination. By 712 CE, Samarkand fell to the Arabs, marking the beginning of Muslim dominance over Sogdia.

Resistance and Turgesh Interventions

The conquest was not uncontested. Sogdian rulers and Turkic allies, including the Turgesh Khaganate, launched repeated uprisings and counterattacks. Notable rebellions, like that of Devashtich of Penjikent, highlighted the enduring resistance to Arab rule. Turgesh raids further destabilized Arab control, especially during the reign of Suluk, their khagan, who briefly reclaimed much of Transoxiana in the early 8th century.

Despite setbacks, the Arabs ultimately consolidated their rule after key victories, such as the Battle of Talas in 751 CE. Although this battle is often mythologized, its impact lay more in securing Arab influence in Transoxiana than in breaking Chinese power, which had already waned due to internal rebellions.

Islamization of Sogdia

The process of Islamization in Sogdia was gradual. Under the Umayyads, conversions were few, as the ruling class initially prioritized taxation over proselytization. Non-Muslims, particularly Zoroastrians, Buddhists, and adherents of local faiths, were treated as second-class citizens under the dhimmi system, subject to the jizya tax.

The Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE) brought significant changes. Abbasid policies encouraged conversion, offering greater equality and opportunities to new Muslims. This period saw a surge in the adoption of Islam, particularly among the Sogdian elite and merchants, who benefited from integrating into the Islamic trade networks. The spread of Islam was further supported by the construction of mosques, such as the one established in Bukhara under Qutayba, and the efforts of Islamic scholars who settled in the region.

Cultural Transformation

The conquest and Islamization transformed Sogdian society. While much of Sogdia's pre-Islamic culture, language, and religious practices persisted for centuries, Islam gradually became the dominant faith. Persian replaced Sogdian as the lingua franca, a shift that reflected broader cultural changes across Central Asia.

Trade along the Silk Road continued to flourish under Islamic rule, with Sogdian merchants adapting to the new order. Cities like Samarkand and Bukhara became important centers of Islamic learning, art, and architecture, laying the foundation for the region's later role as a cultural and intellectual hub under the Samanid and later dynasties.

Legacy

The Muslim conquest of Sogdia marked the region's integration into the Islamic world, reshaping its political and cultural landscape. The gradual Islamization of the population and the region's role in the spread of Islamic culture and trade established Sogdia as a key link between the Middle East, South Asia, and China. While the conquest was initially marked by resistance and conflict, the eventual synthesis of Islamic and Sogdian traditions enriched the cultural heritage of Central Asia.

The Samanid Empire (819–999 CE) was a pivotal power in the history of Central Asia, with its epicenter in Transoxiana and Khorasan, encompassing present-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, northeastern Iran, and parts of Afghanistan. This Persianate Sunni Muslim dynasty, descended from Iranian dehqans, not only fostered a resurgence of Persian culture but also played a crucial role in shaping the Islamic identity of the region.

Origins and Early Rule

The Samanid dynasty traced its roots to Saman Khuda, a dehqan (landowner) from Balkh, who converted from Zoroastrianism to Islam under the Abbasid governor Asad ibn Abdallah al-Qasri. His four grandsons were rewarded for their loyalty to the with governorships across Khorasan and Transoxiana, setting the foundation for the Samanid state. By the mid-9th century, under Nasr I and Ismail Samani, the Samanids consolidated power in the region, asserting independence from their nominal Abbasid overlords.

Height of Power under Ismail Samani

Ismail Samani (r. 892–907 CE) is celebrated as the unifier of the Samanid state. Moving the capital to Bukhara, he established it as a cultural and political rival to Baghdad. Ismail's military prowess was evident in his victories over the Saffarids and local Turkic tribes, extending Samanid rule from Peshawar in the east to Ray and Tabaristan in the west. Bukhara flourished as a center of learning, commerce, and art under his reign.

Ismail's campaigns also included incursions into the steppe, where he converted the Karluk Turks to Islam and initiated the slave trade that became a cornerstone of the Samanid economy. His effective governance ensured peace within his territories, leaving a legacy of stability and prosperity.

Cultural and Religious Renaissance

The Samanids were instrumental in the Persian renaissance, part of the broader "Iranian Intermezzo." They revived the use of Persian as an administrative and literary language, fostering a flourishing cultural identity that was distinct yet deeply Islamic. Bukhara became a hub for scholars, poets, and scientists, hosting luminaries like Rudaki, the father of Persian poetry, and Avicenna, the polymath philosopher and physician.

While Persian culture thrived, Arabic remained the language of science and religious scholarship, creating a dual-language intellectual tradition that enriched the Islamic world. The Samanids also promoted Sunni Islam, but their patronage of diverse religious traditions, including Zoroastrianism and Buddhism, reflected the multicultural nature of their empire.

Decline and Fall

The Samanid Empire began to weaken in the mid-10th century due to internal strife and external pressures. The increasing influence of Turkic military slaves (ghulams) in governance eroded the dynasty's authority. By the late 10th century, the empire faced incursions from the Karakhanids to the north and the Ghaznavids to the south.

In 999 CE, Bukhara fell to the Karakhanids, and the Samanid realm was divided between the Ghaznavid and Karakhanid empires. Ismail Muntasir, a descendant of the Samanid family, made several attempts to restore the dynasty but was ultimately defeated and killed in 1005.

The Samanid Empire's cultural and political contributions left a lasting imprint on Central Asia. They bridged the pre-Islamic Persian heritage with the Islamic world, laying the foundation for the Turko-Persian culture that would dominate the region under subsequent dynasties. The Samanids' promotion of Persian as a literary and administrative language ensured its survival and prominence, influencing Islamic civilization for centuries.

Despite their fall, the Samanids' legacy endured in the Persianate culture of Central Asia, marking their reign as a golden age of cultural and intellectual achievement.

The Kara-Khanid Khanate (9th–13th centuries CE) marked a turning point in the history of Central Asia, signifying the definitive shift from Iranian to Turkic dominance in the region. This Karluk Turkic dynasty ruled lands that today include Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and parts of China, blending native Turkic traditions with Persianate Muslim culture. Their influence spanned the end of the Samanid era to the rise of the Khwarazmian Empire.

Early Conquests and Establishment

The Kara-Khanid Khanate emerged from the Karluk confederation, with the dynasty claiming descent from the legendary figure Afrasiab. By the late 10th century, under Hasan Bughra Khan, the Kara-Khanids began encroaching on Samanid territories. Hasan’s campaigns took key cities such as Isfijab, Samarkand, and Bukhara, though the Samanids briefly recaptured their capital after his death in 992.

Hasan’s cousin, Ali b. Musa, continued the campaign, and by 999, his son Nasr had decisively ended Samanid rule. The Kara-Khanids took Transoxiana, dividing former Samanid domains with the Ghaznavids, who controlled Khorasan and Afghanistan. The Oxus River became the boundary between these two powers, establishing the Kara-Khanids as rulers of Central Asia’s northern heartlands.

Governance and the Appanage System

The Kara-Khanid state was divided into appanages, with power shared among royal family members. Key cities such as Kashgar, Balasagun, Uzgen, and Samarkand became centers of governance. Despite implicit seniority in the eastern domains of Zhetysu and Kashgar, frequent internal conflicts and rivalries plagued the dynasty. The appanage system, while ensuring broader control, also weakened central authority and led to recurring civil wars.

By the early 11th century, the khanate had split into Eastern (centered in Balasaghun and Kashgar) and Western (centered in Samarkand and Bukhara) branches. This division resulted in frequent disputes over regions such as Fergana, which straddled the two realms.

Integration with Islam and Persianate Culture

The Kara-Khanids embraced Islam early in their history, beginning with the conversion of Satuk Bughra Khan in the 10th century. This facilitated the integration of their Turkic identity into the Islamic world. Despite their Turkic origins, the Kara-Khanids adopted Persian as the language of administration and high culture while retaining elements of their nomadic traditions.

Cities such as Samarkand and Kashgar flourished under Kara-Khanid rule, becoming hubs for trade, Islamic learning, and cultural exchange along the Silk Road. Persianate art, architecture, and literature thrived, reflecting the khanate’s synthesis of Turkic and Persian influences.

Relations with the Seljuks and Decline

The arrival of the Seljuks in the mid-11th century marked a period of subordination for the Western Kara-Khanids. After the Seljuks’ victory over the Ghaznavids at the Battle of Dandanaqan (1040), they expanded into Transoxiana. By 1089, the Seljuks had established suzerainty over the Western Khanate, largely controlling its rulers.

The Eastern Kara-Khanids, while briefly submitting to the Seljuks, maintained greater autonomy. However, both branches of the khanate faced increasing pressure from external forces and internal divisions. The Western Khanate fell under the influence of the Qara Khitai (Western Liao dynasty) after the Battle of Qatwan in 1141, while the Eastern Khanate succumbed to the Khwarazmians in 1211.

The Kara-Khanid Khanate played a critical role in shaping Central Asia’s Islamic and Turkic identity. Their rule marked the transition from Iranian to Turkic dominance while preserving and fostering Persianate culture. The dynasty’s blend of Turkic traditions with Islamic and Persian influences laid the foundation for subsequent states, such as the Khwarazmian Empire and the later Mongol-dominated successor states.

The era of Seljuk and Kara-Khanid rule in the lands of modern Uzbekistan marked a significant period of political, cultural, and religious transformation, with shifting powers and foreign invasions shaping the region's identity. From the Seljuks' ascendancy to the Kara-Khanids' vassalage under the Qara Khitai and ultimate downfall, this era laid the groundwork for the Mongol conquest and the rise of new empires in Central Asia.

Seljuk Expansion into Transoxiana

In the mid-11th century, the Seljuk Turks, originally nomadic warriors from the Central Asian steppes, emerged as a dominant force after defeating the Ghaznavids at the Battle of Dandanaqan in 1040. Their expansion brought them into conflict with the Kara-Khanid dynasty, which ruled parts of Transoxiana, including Bukhara and Samarkand.

Initially, the Kara-Khanids resisted Seljuk incursions and even briefly occupied Seljuk territories in Greater Khorasan. However, internal conflicts weakened the Kara-Khanids. In 1089, during the reign of the Seljuk sultan Malik-Shah, the Seljuks entered and took Samarkand, turning the Western Kara-Khanid Khanate into a Seljuk vassal state. For the next half-century, the Seljuks largely controlled appointments within the Western Khanate.

While the Eastern Kara-Khanids, based in Kashgar, briefly submitted to Seljuk authority, they largely retained their autonomy, even staging an invasion into Transoxiana by occupying Termez in the early 12th century. However, Seljuk control began to wane due to internal strife and external pressures, paving the way for new powers to dominate the region.

Qara Khitai Invasion and Kara-Khanid Decline

The Qara Khitai (Western Liao dynasty), remnants of the defunct Liao Empire of China, entered Central Asia in the early 12th century under the leadership of Yelü Dashi. After defeating the Western Kara-Khanids at Khujand in 1137, the Qara Khitai decisively crushed the Seljuks and Kara-Khanids at the Battle of Qatwan near Samarkand in 1141, establishing themselves as the dominant power in the region.

The Qara Khitai allowed the Kara-Khanids to continue ruling as their vassals, collecting taxes and administering Muslim populations in cities like Samarkand and Kashgar. Despite their Buddhist roots, the Qara Khitai practiced religious tolerance, permitting Islamic cultural and religious practices to flourish under their rule. This period saw relative stability but also set the stage for further conflicts.

Khwarazmian Expansion and the Fall of the Kara-Khanids

By the late 12th century, the Khwarazmian Empire, initially a vassal of the Qara Khitai, began asserting its independence and expanding into Transoxiana. The Khwarazmshah Muhammad II forged alliances with some Kara-Khanid rulers, such as Uthman ibn Ibrahim, but later turned against them. In 1210, the Khwarazmians took Samarkand, effectively reducing the Kara-Khanids to nominal rulers.

The Western Kara-Khanid state came to an end in 1212, when the population of Samarkand rebelled against Khwarazmian rule. The Khwarazmshah recaptured the city, executed Uthman ibn Ibrahim, and extinguished the Kara-Khanid dynasty.

The Eastern Kara-Khanid state, based in Kashgar, faced similar challenges. Internal revolts and conflicts with the Qara Khitai weakened their position. By 1211, the Eastern Kara-Khanid dynasty had effectively collapsed, and their territories fell under the control of the Qara Khitai or their Naiman usurper, Kuchlug.

The Seljuk and Kara-Khanid periods in Uzbekistan were pivotal in shaping the region’s identity. The integration of Turkic culture with Islamic traditions, particularly during the Kara-Khanid era, laid the foundations for the subsequent Turko-Persian synthesis. Cities like Bukhara and Samarkand thrived as centers of trade, learning, and culture despite the political upheavals.

The decline of the Seljuks and Kara-Khanids and the rise of the Khwarazmian Empire set the stage for the Mongol invasion of Central Asia, which would bring even more profound changes to the region.

The Khwarazmian Empire rose to power in Central Asia during the late 11th century. Initially a small state ruled by Turkic mamluks under the Seljuk Empire, it grew into a vast and independent empire that spanned modern Uzbekistan, Iran, and Afghanistan. Its rapid expansion, however, was matched by its dramatic collapse under the weight of the Mongol invasion in the early 13th century.

The Khwarazmian dynasty was founded by Anushtegin Gharachai, a Turkic slave-turned-governor of Khwarazm under the Seljuks around 1077. Over time, Anushtegin’s descendants gained greater control of the region. Under Ala ad-Din Atsiz (r. 1127–1156), Khwarazm began to assert independence from the Seljuks and navigated a delicate balance of power with the Qara Khitai, a Central Asian empire. By the time of Atsiz’s death, the Khwarazmians had strengthened their position in northern Iran and Central Asia.

Under the leadership of Il-Arslan (r. 1156–1172), the Khwarazmian Empire began to break away from Seljuk influence as the Seljuk Empire entered a period of decline. Il-Arslan capitalized on this opportunity to expand his territory, bringing important cities like Bukhara and Samarkand under Khwarazmian control.

His successor, Tekish (r. 1172–1200), continued this expansionist policy with even greater ambition. In 1194, Tekish dealt a decisive blow to the Seljuks by defeating their last ruler, Toghrul III, effectively bringing an end to the Seljuk Empire. With this victory, Tekish extended Khwarazmian dominance over Khorasan and much of Iran, solidifying the empire’s position as a major power in the region.

Map of the Khwarazmian Empire. © Ktrinko

The Khwarazmian Empire reached its height under Ala al-Din Muhammad II (r. 1200–1220). Muhammad conquered vast territories, including the lands of the Kara-Khanid Khanate and the Ghurid Empire, stretching Khwarazmian control across Central Asia. Major cities like Samarkand, Bukhara, and Herat became integral parts of his empire.

However, Muhammad’s ambitions brought him into conflict with powerful neighbors, including the Qara Khitai and, ultimately, the Mongols.

In 1218, the Mongol ruler Genghis Khan sent emissaries to Muhammad II, seeking peaceful trade relations. Misinterpreting the Mongols’ intentions as a threat, Muhammad ordered the execution of Genghis Khan’s envoys and merchants.

This act of hostility provoked Genghis Khan, who launched a massive invasion in 1219. The Mongol army swept through the Khwarazmian Empire, destroying cities such as Samarkand and Bukhara and dismantling the once-mighty state in less than two years.

The collapse of the Khwarazmian Empire marked the beginning of Mongol dominance in Central Asia. The devastation of key cities and trade routes reshaped the region for centuries, while the Mongols established a new political order that would transform Central Asia’s history. The fall of the Khwarazmian Empire was a turning point, paving the way for the Mongol conquests that would engulf much of the known world.

The Mongol campaigns in Central Asia were a series of transformative military operations led by Genghis Khan and his generals from 1219 to 1225. These campaigns reshaped the region politically, demographically, and culturally, marking a turning point in its history.

Before targeting Central Asia, Genghis Khan consolidated his power by uniting Mongol and Turkic tribes on the Mongolian plateau. Early conflicts included the destruction of rivals like the Merkit and Naimans, ensuring the dominance of the Mongol Empire in the steppe. Neighboring states like the Uyghurs and Karluks submitted voluntarily, becoming vassals and contributing military and administrative support.

The Qara Khitai Khanate also fell to the Mongols after its usurpation by the fugitive Naiman prince Kuchlug, who alienated local populations through his oppressive rule. In 1216, Mongol general Jebe defeated Kuchlug, ending Qara Khitai dominance and consolidating Mongol control over much of Central Asia by 1218.

In 1219, conflict erupted between the Mongols and the Khwarazmian Empire when Sultan Muhammad executed Mongol envoys and traders. In retaliation, Genghis Khan launched a massive invasion. The Mongols swiftly conquered key cities such as Bukhara, Samarkand, and Gurganj, employing brutal tactics that resulted in widespread destruction and mass civilian casualties. Irrigation networks, especially in Khorasan, were devastated, crippling agriculture for generations.

Despite fierce resistance, the Mongols overwhelmed the Khwarazmian forces, forcing Sultan Muhammad to flee until his death in exile. His son, Jalal al-Din, attempted to resist but was ultimately defeated at the Battle of the Indus in 1221.

The Mongol conquest left a lasting legacy. Large parts of the population were displaced, particularly Iranian-speaking communities who fled southward. The conquest also accelerated the Turkification of the region as Turkic tribes within the Mongol armies intermingled with the local population.

Following Genghis Khan’s death in 1227, the region fell under the control of his son Chaghatai and became part of the larger Mongol Empire, benefiting from relative stability and prosperity under the Chaghatai Khanate for several generations.

After Genghis Khan's death in 1227, his son Chagatai Khan inherited lands corresponding to much of Central Asia, including Transoxania, the Tarim Basin, and surrounding river valleys. Although nominally autonomous, the Chagatai Khanate remained subordinate to the central Mongol court in Karakorum. Chagatai maintained a structured administration, relying on capable officials like Mahmud Yalavach to govern. Even after Chagatai's death in 1242, his legacy persisted, with figures like Mahmud’s son, Mas’ud, effectively managing rebellions and preventing greater Mongol reprisals.

Following Chagatai’s death, his successors experienced instability. Regents such as Ebuskun, widows like Orghana, and external influences like Möngke Khan often dictated the khanate's leadership. The dynasty was repeatedly disrupted by internal conflicts and interventions from other Mongol factions. For example, the region's khans frequently shifted allegiances during the Toluid Civil War, aligning with rivals like Ariq Böke or Kublai Khan to secure power.

From 1266 to 1301, the khanate came under the dominance of Kaidu, a leader of the Ögedeid branch of the Mongols. Kaidu extended his influence over the Chagatai Khanate, often clashing with figures like Baraq, a Muslim convert who sought independence. Kaidu’s conflicts with Kublai Khan and the Yuan dynasty further embroiled the khanate in regional turmoil. The era also saw invasions into Persia, India, and the Yuan dynasty, although these campaigns often ended in defeat.

By the 14th century, the Chagatai Khanate began to fragment. Religious divisions deepened as some rulers converted to Islam, while others clung to traditional Mongol practices. Leaders like Tarmashirin embraced Islam and even raided the Delhi Sultanate, but resistance from anti-Muslim eastern tribes weakened his reign. By the 1340s, the khanate split into two: Moghulistan in the east and Transoxania in the west.

In 1347, the Dughlat amirs elevated Tughlugh Timur as the ruler of Moghulistan. Tughlugh converted to Islam in 1350, uniting the eastern realm under a Muslim identity. However, the western region, plagued by factionalism, fell into disarray. In 1360, Tughlugh invaded Transoxania, briefly stabilizing it before his death in 1363.

This power vacuum allowed Timur (Tamerlane) to rise. Initially serving under Tughlugh, Timur consolidated his power in Transoxania by defeating rivals like Amir Husayn. By 1369, Timur ruled Transoxania in all but name, keeping puppet khans from Genghis Khan’s lineage to legitimize his authority. This marked the beginning of the Timurid Empire, which replaced the Chagatai Khanate as the dominant power in Central Asia.

The Chagatai Khanate played a pivotal role in shaping Central Asia's political and cultural landscape. Its rulers introduced Islamic governance, facilitated interactions between nomadic and sedentary societies, and laid the groundwork for later powers like the Timurids. However, persistent internal conflicts and external pressures from neighboring Mongol factions ultimately fragmented the khanate, ending its prominence by the late 14th century.

In the early 14th century, the once-powerful Chagatai Khanate began to fragment as competing tribal leaders vied for control. Out of this chaos, Timur (Tamerlane) rose to prominence in the 1380s, establishing himself as the dominant force in Mawarannahr (Transoxiana). Although Timur was not a descendant of Genghis Khan, he wielded considerable influence and became the de facto ruler of the region. Over the next two decades, he launched a series of military campaigns, conquering vast territories across Central Asia, Iran, Asia Minor, and parts of Russia, even reaching the southern steppes north of the Aral Sea. Timur's ambitions extended to China, but his death in 1405 halted this campaign.

Timur made Samarkand, his capital, the cultural and intellectual hub of his empire. He brought artisans, scholars, and craftsmen from the lands he conquered, creating a vibrant Perso-Islamic culture. Religious and architectural projects flourished, with grand mosques and palaces reshaping Samarkand and other cities. His grandson Ulugh Beg, a renowned astronomer, epitomized the dynasty’s scientific achievements.

Although the Timurids were Persianate in their cultural orientation, Turkic gained prominence as a literary language during this period. The Chaghatai dialect developed as a distinct literary medium, with writers like Ali Shir Nava'i, based in Herat, elevating Turkic literature to new heights in the 15th century.

Timur’s empire quickly fractured after his death, splitting into rival factions. Internal conflicts weakened the dynasty, drawing the attention of the Uzbeks, nomadic tribes living north of the Aral Sea. In 1501, the Uzbeks launched a major invasion of Mawarannahr, signaling the end of the Timurid era and the rise of the Uzbek-controlled Sheibanid Khanate.

Despite its decline, the Timurid period left a lasting legacy of cultural and scientific achievements that shaped the future of Central Asia.

The Ulugh Beg Madrasa, constructed between 1417 and 1421, stands as a masterpiece of Timurid architecture and an enduring symbol of Samarkand's historical and cultural significance. Built by Ulugh Beg, Timur's grandson and a celebrated astronomer, this madrasa became a prominent center of learning in the Timurid Empire, fostering both religious and secular scholarship. Located on the Registan Square, it is the oldest surviving building of the ensemble and a vital piece of the area's UNESCO World Heritage status.

Ulugh Beg, a scholar and pious Muslim, viewed education as a divine pursuit. The madrasa reflected his dedication to knowledge, offering instruction in Islamic theology alongside mathematics, astronomy, and other sciences. Distinguished scholars of the era taught here, further enhancing the madrasa's reputation. Its architecture, notably its decorative facade featuring celestial patterns, hints at Ulugh Beg's passion for astronomy. For a time, part of the madrasa even served as an observatory before the construction of the separate Ulugh Beg Observatory.

The madrasa's design is a marvel of symmetry and artistry. It features a rectangular layout measuring 56 by 81 meters, with a central courtyard surrounded by two-story galleries housing 50 cells for students. Each corner houses domed classrooms, and the western side contains a mosque. The grand entrance, or pishtaq, towers over the complex, adorned with a kufic inscription extolling its monumental presence.

The madrasa's intricate decorative elements include geometric girih patterns, floral designs, and vivid kufic inscriptions, all executed in vibrant glazes of turquoise, blue, and yellow on a yellow-brown base. The facade’s "constellations" are a direct nod to Ulugh Beg's astronomical pursuits, underscoring the blend of science and faith that defined his legacy.

Though Ulugh Beg established other madrasas in Bukhara and G’ijduvon, the Samarkand madrasa remains his most iconic creation. Its architectural innovations, such as placing classrooms in the corners, influenced the design of later madrasas throughout Central Asia.

The madrasa stands as a testament to Ulugh Beg's dual identity as a devout Muslim and a pioneering scholar, embodying the intellectual and cultural heights of the Timurid era. Today, it continues to inspire awe as a centerpiece of Samarkand's rich history.

After the establishment of the Uzbek Khanate in 1428, Abu'l-Khayr Khan began consolidating power across the steppe. He unified various nomadic tribes in the region, including many remnants of the Golden Horde, and established a strong political and military base. Abu'l-Khayr expanded the khanate’s influence by dominating parts of modern-day Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Siberia. However, his rule faced challenges, including internal dissent and pressure from neighboring powers like the Kazakh Khanate, formed by tribes that had broken away from his rule.

In 1468, Abu'l-Khayr died during a campaign against the Kazakhs, and the khanate fell into turmoil. His death allowed rival states, particularly the Kazakh Khanate, to strengthen their hold on key regions. By the late 15th century, the Uzbek Khanate fractured into smaller entities, leading to the emergence of successor states such as the Shaybanid dynasty, which moved south into Transoxiana. Under Muhammad Shaybani in the early 16th century, the Uzbeks conquered Samarkand and Bukhara, displacing the Timurid dynasty and establishing the foundation for the Khanate of Bukhara.

In 1494, at just eleven years old, Babur inherited the throne of Fergana after his father, Umar Sheikh Mirza, died in a tragic accident involving a dovecote collapse. His rule was immediately contested by his uncles and a faction of nobles who favored his younger brother Jahangir as ruler. With the support of his maternal grandmother, Aisan Daulat Begum, and a stroke of luck, Babur managed to secure his position, though his rule remained precarious.

Babur’s world was one of constant rivalry, with neighboring rulers, all descendants of Timur or Genghis Khan, embroiled in territorial disputes. His ambitions quickly turned toward capturing the city of Samarkand, a prize he considered essential for his legacy. At just fifteen, Babur achieved a monumental victory in 1497 when he besieged and took Samarkand after a grueling seven-month campaign. However, his triumph was short-lived. A rebellion in Fergana and a subsequent illness weakened his hold on Samarkand, and he lost both territories within months. Reflecting on his 100-day rule of Samarkand, Babur later described the loss as one of the greatest disappointments of his life.

Undeterred, Babur rebuilt his forces, relying heavily on Tajik recruits from Badakhshan. In 1500, he launched another campaign to reclaim Samarkand. Though he briefly succeeded, he soon faced defeat at the hands of Muhammad Shaybani, the powerful Khan of the Uzbeks. Babur was forced to give his sister, Khanzada, to Shaybani in marriage as part of a peace settlement, ensuring the safety of his retreating army. Once again, Samarkand slipped from his grasp.

Babur’s fortunes continued to decline. He failed to reclaim Fergana and was left wandering the mountains of Central Asia, surviving with the aid of hill tribes. By 1502, he had abandoned hope of recovering his lost territories and sought refuge in Tashkent under the rule of his maternal uncle. His welcome there was cold, and he experienced deep humiliation. Reflecting on this period, Babur wrote of enduring poverty and despair, feeling as though he had no country or future.

Despite these hardships, this difficult decade shaped Babur’s resilience and ambition, laying the foundation for his later conquests and the establishment of the Mughal Empire in India.

The Khanate of Bukhara, an Uzbek state, was established in 1501 by the Abu'l-Khayrid branch of the Shaybanid dynasty. Initially part of the broader Shaybanid movement, the Khanate briefly made Bukhara its capital under Ubaidullah Khan (1533–1540). The state reached its zenith under Abdullah Khan II (1557–1598), a scholarly ruler who expanded its influence and brought stability to the region.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Khanate was governed by the Janid dynasty, also known as the Astrakhanids, who were descendants of Genghis Khan. They were the last Genghisids to rule Bukhara. However, the Khanate faced external challenges, including its conquest by Nader Shah of Iran in 1740. After Nader Shah's death in 1747, power gradually shifted to the Uzbek emir Khudayar Bi and his descendants, who controlled the khanate through the influential role of *ataliq* (prime minister).

In 1785, Shah Murad, a descendant of Khudayar Bi, formalized his family's rule under the Manghit dynasty, transforming the Khanate into the Emirate of Bukhara. The Manghits broke from Genghisid traditions, adopting the Islamic title of Emir instead of Khan, as their legitimacy was no longer tied to descent from Genghis Khan.

The Battle of Marv, fought in 1510, was a pivotal clash in the history of Central Asia between the Timurid prince Babur's ally, Shah Ismail I of the Safavid Empire, and Muhammad Shaybani Khan, the founder of the Uzbek state. The battle marked a dramatic turning point in the rivalry between the Uzbeks and the Safavids, as well as in Babur's fortunes.

Muhammad Shaybani Khan had established dominance over much of Central Asia, including Transoxiana and Samarkand, by overthrowing Timurid rulers. His expansionist policies clashed with the Safavid Shah Ismail I, who sought to extend Safavid influence into Khorasan. Babur, the exiled Timurid prince and a long-time rival of Shaybani, allied himself with Shah Ismail to reclaim his ancestral territories.

Shah Ismail's forces, comprised of a disciplined Qizilbash army, marched to confront Shaybani, who had fortified himself near Marv in modern-day Turkmenistan. Despite the numerical superiority of Shaybani's troops, the Safavids employed superior tactics and used their elite cavalry to devastating effect. Shaybani's forces were routed, and he was killed in the battle. His death marked a significant blow to Uzbek power.

The defeat at Marv shattered the Uzbek Khanate's control over Khorasan, temporarily restoring Safavid dominance in the region. Babur seized the opportunity to reclaim Samarkand, fulfilling a long-held ambition. However, his reign there was short-lived as Shaybani's successors regrouped, and Babur was soon forced to flee.

The Battle of Marv was a key moment in the power struggle between the Safavids and Uzbeks and highlighted the fluid and violent political landscape of Central Asia during the early 16th century. It also exemplified Babur's resilience and the geopolitical complexities of the region, as alliances shifted between Timurid heirs, Uzbek conquerors, and Safavid rulers.

The Khanate of Khiva emerged in 1511 as a powerful state in the Khwarazm region, centered around the city of Khiva and the fertile plains of the lower Amu Darya. Stretching across modern western Uzbekistan, southwestern Kazakhstan, and much of Turkmenistan, the khanate maintained its independence for centuries, though it faced periods of turbulence, including occupation by Nader Shah of Persia from 1740 to 1746.

By the 19th century, the Khanate faced growing pressures from Russian imperial expansion. In 1873, after a series of military campaigns, Khiva was forced to cede significant territory and accept Russian protectorate status, though it retained internal autonomy. The Khanate survived in this diminished capacity until the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Inspired by revolutionary currents, Khiva underwent its own upheaval in 1920. The Khanate was abolished, replaced by the Khorezm People's Soviet Republic, marking the end of its centuries-long rule. By 1924, the region was fully absorbed into the Soviet Union, becoming part of modern Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, with its legacy enduring in regions like Karakalpakstan and the Xorazm Region.

Under Abdullah Khan II, the Khanate of Bukhara emerged as the dominant power in Central Asia, marking the final chapter of the Shaybanid dynasty's rule. His reign, lasting from 1583 until his death in 1598, was defined by military conquests, territorial unification, and significant political reforms, solidifying Bukhara as the cultural and political heart of the region.

Abdullah’s ascent was shaped by decades of internal struggle among the Uzbek tribes and rival khans. The Shaybanid state, fractured and divided between Bukhara, Samarkand, Balkh, and Tashkent, was plagued by constant infighting. Abdullah first established control over Bukhara, using it as a base to bring the other regions under his authority. By the early 1580s, he had subdued his rivals and united the four key centers into a single, cohesive khanate. For the first time in decades, the Shaybanids ruled a stable and centralized state.

With internal unity achieved, Abdullah turned his attention to external expansion. His armies marched into Badakhshan in 1584, and by 1588, they had seized Khorasan from Persian rule. The conquest of Khorasan marked a significant victory over the Safavids, cementing Abdullah’s reputation as a powerful ruler. To the north, his forces captured Khorezm and defeated the rulers of Khiva, bringing the region firmly under Bukhara’s control. The once-independent territories along the Amu Darya were now subordinate to Abdullah's growing empire, and his authority stretched across Central Asia.

During his reign, Abdullah also maintained complex diplomatic relations with neighboring powers. A non-aggression pact with the Mughal Emperor Akbar ensured peace on his southern border, allowing him to focus on campaigns against Persia and Khorezm. Relations with Russia, however, grew tense, particularly over Abdullah’s support for the Siberian Khan Kuchum, who resisted Russian expansion into the steppe. Despite this, trade flourished under his rule, as Bukhara became a key hub along the Silk Road, connecting markets from India to Russia.

Politically, Abdullah oversaw reforms that strengthened the khanate’s economy and administration. He introduced monetary policies to stabilize trade, issuing standardized silver and copper coinage that helped end the currency crisis. These measures fueled economic growth and reinforced Bukhara’s position as a regional center of commerce and culture.

Culturally, Abdullah Khan’s court became a gathering place for scholars, poets, and historians. Bukhara witnessed the construction of monumental buildings, such as the Kosh-Madrasa, which reflected the architectural and artistic brilliance of the period. Under Abdullah’s patronage, Persian and Turkic literature flourished, and the city’s reputation as a center of learning and piety grew.

Abdullah’s final years were marked by internal turmoil. His son Abdulmumin rebelled, challenging his father’s authority and plunging the khanate into conflict. Though Abdullah prepared to crush the revolt, his death in 1598 left the state vulnerable. The rebellion, combined with external threats, quickly unraveled the stability Abdullah had fought to achieve. Abdulmumin’s death soon after sparked a succession crisis, leading to the fall of the Shaybanid dynasty. The Janids (Ashtarkhanids), distant relatives of the Shaybanids, seized power in the aftermath, ending Abdullah’s line.

By the late 16th century, the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva began to show signs of decline. Years of relentless warfare—both against each other and the Safavid Persians—strained their resources and weakened their ability to govern effectively. Internal rivalries among the ruling families and their heirs further fractured the stability of these states. At the same time, a broader economic shift was underway. The rise of European maritime trade routes bypassed the traditional Silk Road, which had long sustained Central Asia's great cities. As trade dwindled and vital centers such as Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva, and Urgench began to decline, the region’s economic power waned.

Amid this decline, the Shaybanid dynasty, which had ruled Bukhara for nearly a century, came to an end. In 1599, Baqi Muhammad Khan, a descendant of the Astrakhanid (Janid) lineage, overthrew the last Shaybanid ruler, Pir Muhammad Khan II. Baqi Muhammad thus became the founder of the Janid dynasty, also known as the Ashtarkhanids. Though his reign was brief, he implemented important administrative, tax, and military reforms that brought temporary stability to the Khanate. These changes laid the groundwork for further development, and Baqi Muhammad Khan’s rule marked the beginning of a new era for Bukhara.

The Janid period saw a flourishing of culture and literature, even as the state’s political cohesion began to erode. Uzbek poets such as Turdy and Mashrab emerged during this time, writing in Chagatai and Persian. Their works often reflected social themes and called for unity among the Uzbeks, particularly the "92 Uzbek tribes," a term frequently mentioned in historical accounts of the late 17th century. Historians like Abdurahman Tole, Muhammad Amin Bukhari, and Mutribi documented the era, producing notable Persian-language historical works.

However, the stability brought by the Janids proved short-lived. By the early 18th century, the Khanate of Bukhara began to disintegrate. After the assassination of Ubaydullah Khan in 1711, the state fragmented into semi-autonomous principalities. Abu'l-Fayz Khan, who came to power in the wake of this turmoil, was left with little real authority. Some accounts suggest his control extended only to a few districts like Qarakul, Wardanzi, Wabkent, and Ghijduwan, while others claim his rule barely reached beyond the walls of the Bukharan citadel.

This period of political fragmentation left the Khanate of Bukhara vulnerable to external threats and internal instability, marking the beginning of its gradual decline. The once-powerful state that had dominated Central Asia struggled to maintain its unity as the region drifted into a period of turmoil and change.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Uzbek khanates faced persistent raids from neighboring nomadic groups, notably the Kazakhs and the Dzungars. The Kazakhs, a confederation of Turkic-speaking nomads, had established their own khanate in the late 15th century. By the 17th century, they frequently clashed with the Uzbeks over territory and resources. Simultaneously, the Dzungars—a federation of Western Mongol tribes—emerged as a formidable power. Their military campaigns extended into Central Asia, targeting both Kazakh and Uzbek territories. These incursions caused widespread disruption, weakening the Uzbek khanates and contributing to their eventual decline.

Shah Jahan’s Central Asian Campaign of 1646–1647 marked the Mughal Empire’s ambitious attempt to reclaim ancestral lands in Transoxiana, driven by Shah Jahan’s deep reverence for the legacy of Timur and Babur. The campaign targeted the territories of Balkh and Badakhshan, now under the control of the Uzbek Khanate of Bukhara, which had fallen into disarray due to internal conflict and instability under the rule of Nazr Muhammad and his son Abd al-Aziz.

The Mughal campaign began with Shah Jahan sending exploratory missions under commanders like Raja Jagat Singh and Ali Mardan Khan, who encountered logistical challenges in the harsh terrain of the Hindu Kush. Despite these setbacks, the deteriorating situation within the Uzbek Khanate encouraged Shah Jahan to intervene. Nazr Muhammad, beset by betrayal and rebellion, wrote to Shah Jahan for help, which the emperor saw as an opportunity to restore Mughal control over what he viewed as their hereditary lands.

Shah Jahan mobilized a massive army under his youngest son, Murad Bakhsh. By mid-1646, the Mughals had subdued Balkh with little resistance as Nazr Muhammad fled to Persia. The conquest was celebrated with great enthusiasm in India, but problems soon arose. Murad, frustrated by the hardships of the unfamiliar territory and the resistance of local populations, abandoned his post despite Shah Jahan’s orders. Governance of Balkh fell into disarray, and Mughal troops, already demoralized, suffered constant harassment from Uzbek raiders.

To salvage the situation, Shah Jahan dispatched his more capable son, Aurangzeb, in 1647 with a smaller but disciplined army. Aurangzeb achieved notable victories against the Uzbeks, including triumphs at Derah-i-Garz and Aqcha. However, sustaining control over Balkh proved untenable. The harsh climate, lack of provisions, and hostility from local inhabitants made further occupation impractical. Both the Mughals and the Uzbeks, led by Abd al-Aziz, sought peace. Aurangzeb relinquished Balkh and retreated to Kabul, effectively ending the campaign.

The failed campaign proved costly for the Mughal Empire. Shah Jahan had spent an enormous sum, and the treacherous mountain passes claimed thousands of lives. The economic and human toll dissuaded the Mughals from any further attempts to conquer Transoxiana, leaving Shah Jahan’s dream of reclaiming his ancestral lands unfulfilled. The campaign’s failure also emboldened neighboring powers, with Persia interpreting the withdrawal as a sign of Mughal weakness, paving the way for future conflicts between the two empires.

By the late 16th and early 17th centuries, Russia first made its mark on Central Asia through the Cossack adventurers who ventured into Siberia. These Cossacks conquered the Siberian forests but refrained from advancing southward onto the Central Asian steppe. Their primary aim was the lucrative fur trade, which they found abundant in the forest regions. The steppe nomads, however, were formidable and warlike compared to the weaker forest tribes, keeping the Russians focused on the north for the time being.

In the aftermath of centuries of instability, Central Asia entered a period of further disruption marked by continuous invasions from Iran to the south and pressures from nomadic tribes in the north. The appearance of the Russians introduced a new power dynamic in the region. Russian merchants gradually began expanding trade routes into the Kazakh grasslands, building connections with Tashkent and even with Khiva.

However, the relationship was not purely commercial. Russian slaves were increasingly trafficked into Central Asia by Kazakh and Turkmen tribes. Captives from border raids and shipwrecked sailors on the Caspian Sea frequently ended up in the slave markets of Bukhara or Khiva. By the eighteenth century, the presence of Russian slaves and the flourishing trade in human captives began to provoke hostility in Russia toward the Central Asian khanates.

Meanwhile, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, Central Asia experienced a period of revival. New dynasties emerged and consolidated power: the Qongrats in Khiva, the Manghits in Bukhara, and the Mins in Kokand. These rulers rebuilt centralized states, strengthened their armies, and invested in irrigation projects to stabilize their economies. Yet, this resurgence occurred at a time when two global powers, Russia and Britain, were vying for influence in the region. As Russia expanded its control over the Kazakh steppes and Britain established its rule in India, Central Asia became a focal point of the so-called Great Game, a geopolitical struggle between the two empires.

In the nineteenth century, Russia's interest in Central Asia grew significantly, driven partly by concerns over rising British influence in the region and partly by economic motivations. Russia sought to dominate regional trade and secure a reliable source of cotton. The importance of Central Asian cotton increased dramatically during the United States Civil War,^[2] which disrupted cotton supplies from Russia's main provider, the southern United States.

The Central Asian khanates, however, paid little attention to this European rivalry. They remained consumed by their own ambitions, waging wars of conquest against one another while Russia and Britain maneuvered for dominance on their borders. This internal strife left the khanates vulnerable, a reality that would eventually allow Russia to take advantage of their fragmented state.

The Khanate of Kokand emerged in 1709 when Shahrukh, a Shaybanid ruler of the Ming tribe, broke away from the Khanate of Bukhara and declared independence in the Fergana Valley. Centered in the small town of Kokand, Shahrukh established a citadel that would grow into the khanate's political heart. His successors, Abdul Kahrim Bey and Narbuta Bey, expanded the citadel, but their state fell under the shadow of the Qing dynasty, forced into a tributary relationship by the late 18th century.

The khanate's fortunes turned with Narbuta Bey's son, Alim, a shrewd and aggressive leader. Alim consolidated control over the western Fergana Valley, including Khujand and Tashkent, using mercenary armies from the highlands. However, his reign was cut short when he was assassinated by his brother Umar in 1811. Under Umar's son, Madali Khan, who took the throne in 1822, the Khanate of Kokand reached its peak territorial expansion.

Despite its strength, Kokand found itself entangled in a volatile regional dynamic. Madali Khan sought alliances, including overtures to Russia, but his efforts alienated neighboring powers. The Emir of Bukhara, Nasrullah Khan, invaded Kokand in 1842, encouraged by internal dissent among Kokandian elites. Nasrullah executed Madali Khan, his family, and the renowned poet Nodira, installing Madali's cousin, Shir Ali, as a puppet ruler.

The following decades were marked by bitter internal struggles and external pressure. Civil war consumed Kokand, weakening it further as the Emirate of Bukhara and the Russian Empire sought to expand their influence. The Kyrgyz tribes broke away during this period, forming their own Khanate under Ormon Khan. Meanwhile, Russia steadily advanced into Central Asia, capturing Tashkent in 1865 and Khujand in 1867, significantly reducing Kokand's power.

At the same time, one of Kokand's most prominent figures, Yakub Beg, left for Kashgar to exploit Qing China's weakness. With the help of Kokandian soldiers, Yakub Beg established a short-lived independent state, Yettishar, in the Tarim Basin.

In Kokand itself, Khudayar Khan, who ruled intermittently between 1844 and 1875, oversaw lavish construction projects, including his ornate palace, while his oppressive taxes alienated the population. The growing discontent culminated in an uprising in 1875 that forced Khudayar Khan into exile. His son, Nasruddin Khan, briefly ascended the throne but failed to rally support against Russian encroachment.

Seizing on the chaos, Russian generals Konstantin von Kaufman and Mikhail Skobelev swiftly annexed the Khanate of Kokand in 1876. Tsar Alexander II justified the conquest as meeting the "wishes of the Kokandi people" to become Russian subjects. With Kokand's absorption into the Fergana Oblast of Russian Turkestan, the once-powerful khanate ceased to exist, marking the end of centuries of Uzbek rule in the Fergana Valley.

The Russian conquest of Central Asia marked a dramatic shift in power dynamics across the region, as the khanates and nomadic territories faced the advancing forces of the expanding Russian Empire. Beginning in the 18th century, Russia's focus gradually moved from Siberia and the Kazakh steppe to the heartlands of Central Asia, including Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand.

In the early 18th century, Peter the Great sought to establish Russian influence through ambitious yet ultimately unsuccessful expeditions. Lieutenant Colonel Buchholz, tasked in 1714 with building fortresses and locating gold along the Amu Darya, faced defeat at the hands of the Dzungar Khanate, who outmatched the ill-prepared Russians. In a subsequent attempt in 1717, Bekovich-Cherkassky’s Khivan campaign ended in disaster when the Khan of Khiva lured the Russian forces into a trap, resulting in the destruction of their army. These early setbacks temporarily stalled Russian ambitions in the region.

Over the next century, Russia focused on solidifying control over the Kazakh steppe. By 1822, the Khanate of the Middle jüz was abolished, and Russia steadily extended its influence through military expeditions and administrative reforms. However, this encroachment sparked resistance, most notably from Kenesary Khan, who led a significant rebellion between 1843 and 1844. Despite his tactical successes, Kenesary’s forces were eventually crushed, and the Kazakh Khanate ceased to exist by 1847.

By the mid-19th century, Russia adopted a more methodical approach to Central Asia. Their conquest began along the Syr Darya River, where fortresses like Ak-Mechet fell after prolonged sieges in the 1850s. From there, the Russians advanced into the fertile Ferghana Valley and along the Tien Shan Mountains, engaging the Khanate of Kokand. The capture of Tashkent in 1865 was a turning point, as it secured Russian dominance in the region and allowed for further advances into Bukhara and Samarkand.

The Khanate of Khiva, historically isolated by deserts, proved a more challenging target. Attempts in 1839 to conquer Khiva faltered due to harsh winters and logistical failures. However, by 1873, under General Kaufmann, a coordinated Russian campaign overcame the Khivan defenses, establishing the khanate as a protectorate. Around the same time, the Russians turned their attention to the Turkomans of the Karakum Desert. The decisive battles at Geok Tepe in 1881 marked the end of significant Turkoman resistance, with tens of thousands killed in the brutal siege.

Russia's expansion into the Pamirs and its conflicts with Britain over Afghanistan highlighted the broader geopolitical tension known as the Great Game. British fears of a Russian advance on India were often exaggerated, but the two empires clashed diplomatically and engaged in proxy conflicts throughout the 19th century. The annexation of Merv in 1884 and the Panjdeh Incident of 1885 brought Russian influence to the Afghan border, where the final frontier was demarcated through treaties rather than open war.

By the late 19th century, Central Asia was firmly under Russian control. The khanates of Bukhara and Khiva remained nominally independent but operated as vassals of the Tsar. Kokand, however, was fully annexed and incorporated into the Russian Empire. With the construction of railways and military infrastructure, Russian dominance in Central Asia was complete, marking the end of centuries of khanate rule and the beginning of a new era under imperial Russian governance.

In the mid-eighteenth century, the rising power of Nader Shah’s Afsharid Empire brought Central Asia’s Uzbek khanates—Bukhara and Khiva—under Persian control, marking a significant moment in the region’s history. The conflicts began when Nader Shah's son and viceroy, Reza Qoli Mirza, launched successful campaigns against Khiva while Nader himself focused on the conquest of India. These early incursions angered Ilbars Khan, the ruler of Khiva, who threatened retaliation. Despite Reza Qoli's victories, Nader ordered a halt to hostilities, though he soon returned from Delhi with greater ambitions.

Nader Shah launched a decisive campaign to bring the Uzbek khanates to heel. To prepare for his invasion, a bridge was constructed over the Oxus River to facilitate his army's passage, along with fortifications housing thousands of soldiers. With his army organized into precise divisions of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, Nader Shah advanced on Bukhara. The Persians unleashed devastating firepower using cannons, mortars, and swivel guns—something the Uzbek forces had never encountered. Disoriented and outmatched, the Uzbeks quickly retreated, and Bukhara fell to Persian control. Thousands of Uzbek soldiers were conscripted into Nader's army as auxiliaries, securing his victory.

Having subdued Bukhara, Nader Shah turned his attention to Khiva. Ilbars Khan, defiant to the end, refused to submit to Nader’s demands and executed his Persian ambassadors. This act provoked Nader to launch a campaign into Khwarazm, leading to a decisive confrontation at the Battle of Pitnak in 1740. Despite commanding a formidable force of 30,000 Uzbek and Turkmen horsemen, Ilbars Khan was unable to withstand Nader’s superior strategy and firepower. The battle ended in a crushing defeat for Khiva, with Ilbars Khan eventually besieged and forced to surrender. In retaliation for the execution of Persian envoys, Nader Shah ordered Ilbars and his amirs to be executed—some sources claim they were buried alive.

Persian dominance over the Uzbek khanates was short-lived but unprecedented. Nader Shah installed loyal appointees to govern Bukhara and Khiva, extending Persian influence deep into Central Asia. However, rebellions soon erupted, forcing Nader to send troops back to reassert control. Though the Afsharid Empire’s grip weakened after Nader Shah’s death, his campaigns left an indelible mark on Central Asia, demonstrating the overwhelming power of Persian military might at the time.

The Emirate of Bukhara emerged in 1785, as the Manghit dynasty consolidated power over the remnants of the Khanate of Bukhara. For decades prior, the emirs had been steadily gaining control, holding the powerful position of ataliq while puppet khans from the Janid dynasty sat on the throne. However, following the death of Abu l-Ghazi Khan, Shah Murad formally claimed leadership, solidifying the Manghit dynasty and marking the emirate's official founding. Unlike many Central Asian states, the Emirate of Bukhara did not rely on Genghisid lineage for legitimacy; instead, its rulers adopted the Islamic title Emir, grounding their authority in religious principles.

The emirate's political history reflected the turbulence of the region in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Central Asia, fragmented after the fall of the Mongol Empire and Timurids, had become a battleground for competing khanates and external empires. In Bukhara, dynastic struggles were often compounded by foreign incursions, particularly from Persia. After Nader Shah’s campaigns in the 1740s, the emirate gradually reasserted its autonomy under the Manghits, maintaining control of the core territories along the Zarafshon River and the ancient cities of Bukhara and Samarkand.

By the early 19th century, the Emirate of Bukhara had become embroiled in the Great Game, the geopolitical contest between Russia and Britain for dominance in Central Asia. Under Emir Nasrullah Khan, the emirate became infamous for its political volatility and resistance to outside interference. Nasrullah’s execution of British officers Charles Stoddart and Arthur Conolly in 1842 was emblematic of the emirate’s fierce independence, though it further highlighted its growing isolation.

The Russian Empire’s steady advance into Central Asia marked a turning point for Bukhara. In 1868, after losing a war against Russia, the emirate was forced to cede large swathes of territory, including Samarkand. Five years later, in 1873, the emirate became a Russian protectorate, surrounded by the newly established Governorate-General of Turkestan. Though the Manghit dynasty remained nominally in power, Russian influence curtailed the emirate’s autonomy. The Russians abolished the Bukhara slave trade in 1873, and by 1885, slavery itself was formally ended.

While the emirate survived into the early 20th century, its conservative leadership resisted internal reform efforts. Emir Mohammed Alim Khan, the last ruler, found himself increasingly at odds with reformists and revolutionaries inspired by the changing political landscape. With the Bolsheviks' rise to power in Russia, Bukharan reformists turned to the Red Army for support. In March 1920, the Red Army launched its first assault on Bukhara but failed. However, a second attack in September succeeded, bringing an end to the emirate. Mohammed Alim Khan fled into exile, and the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic was established in its place.

The fall of the Emirate of Bukhara marked the end of centuries of Islamic rule in the region. While the emirate had once been a center of religious scholarship and trade, it could not withstand the pressures of modernization, Russian imperialism, and the political upheaval brought by the Soviet revolution. The legacy of the emirate lives on in the cultural and architectural treasures of Bukhara and Samarkand, which remain symbols of Central Asia’s rich history.

After the Russian conquest of Central Asia, the daily life of Central Asians remained largely unchanged during the first few decades. The Russians focused primarily on increasing cotton production and establishing settlements near cities like Tashkent and Samarkand, but they lived separately from the indigenous population. A new middle class began to emerge, and peasants experienced shifts due to the emphasis on cotton cultivation.

Russian Turkestan in 1900. © Wassily

By the late 19th century, changes accelerated with the construction of Russian railroads, which brought more settlers into the region. Russian involvement in local affairs deepened, especially after small revolts in the 1890s, leading to tighter control. Policies such as refusing to approve waqf documents caused a decline in living standards for Islamic "sacred families."

Amidst growing Russian influence, the Pan-Turkish Jadidist movement emerged in the 1860s, led by intellectuals aiming to protect Central Asian Islamic culture. By 1900, it evolved into a political resistance movement, though it faced opposition from both Russian authorities and Uzbek khans, who saw it as a threat to their respective interests.

Economically, Russian rule brought industrial development tied to cotton production, but the local textile industry lagged behind. Most of the cotton crop was exported to Russia for processing. While Central Asia remained largely self-sufficient in food during this period, the increasing focus on cotton production began to shift the agricultural balance. This trend intensified during the Soviet era, when Moscow's aggressive policies turned Uzbekistan into a cotton monoculture, creating long-term economic and environmental challenges that persist to this day.

The construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway began in 1879 under Russian imperial rule during the conquest of Transcaspia. Initially a narrow-gauge line, it was quickly converted to the standard Russian gauge. The railway was extended through Ashkabad and Merv (modern Mary) by 1886 under General Annenkoff. It originally started at Uzun-Ada on the Caspian Sea, but the terminus was later moved to Krasnovodsk.

By 1888, the railway reached Samarkand via Bukhara. Construction paused for a decade before continuing to Tashkent and Andijan in 1898. A permanent bridge over the Amu-Darya (Oxus) was completed in 1901, replacing a temporary wooden structure prone to flood damage. In 1906, the Tashkent Railway connected the Trans-Caspian line to the broader Russian railway network, enabling greater integration with European trade.

Map of the main road of the Trans-Caspian railway. © Peter Christener

By the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Russian influence had begun to reshape Central Asia, particularly among a new generation of young intellectuals. These intellectuals, often the sons of wealthy merchants, were educated in local Muslim schools, Russian institutions, or even in Istanbul. Known as the Jadidists, they emerged as a reformist movement seeking to modernize Central Asian society. Inspired by ideas from Russia, Istanbul, and the Tatar intellectual community, the Jadidists argued that progress and independence could only be achieved through reforms in education, culture, and even religion. They believed that adopting modern, secular knowledge and blending it with Islamic values was essential to counter Russian domination and revitalize their society.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 brought a surprising victory for Japan, the first time an Asian power had triumphed over a European empire. This, coupled with the outbreak of revolution in Russia the same year, sparked hope among Central Asian reformers that the tsarist grip might weaken. Reform factions saw an opportunity for change, envisioning a new era where modernization and independence could become a reality.

However, the optimism of 1905 was short-lived. Though the Russian government initially promised reforms, these efforts faded as the tsarist regime restored authoritarian control. In response, many Jadidist leaders, including future figures like Abdur Rauf Fitrat, were forced underground or into exile. The rulers of the remaining independent Central Asian emirates, such as Bukhara and Khiva, also maintained conservative, reactionary policies that stifled reformist activities.

Despite these setbacks, the Jadidist movement continued to grow, spreading its ideology of modernization and reform throughout the region. As tensions simmered beneath the surface, the coming years would see these ideas collide with worsening social and economic conditions under Russian rule, setting the stage for future unrest.

The Central Asian Revolt of 1916 was a devastating uprising against Russian colonial rule, triggered by Tsar Nicholas II's decision to conscript Central Asian Muslims into labor battalions for World War I. Although exempt from combat roles, the decree exacerbated existing tensions caused by decades of land confiscation, economic exploitation, and the exclusion of Central Asians from political representation. This policy, combined with widespread discontent over corruption, unfair land distribution, and interethnic tensions, ignited anger across the region.

The revolt began in July 1916 in Khujand (modern-day Tajikistan) and quickly spread across Turkestan, particularly in the Ferghana Valley, Semirechye, and the steppes. Villages erupted in spontaneous, uncoordinated uprisings. Central Asian rebels, poorly armed with spears and rudimentary weapons, attacked Russian settlers, Cossack garrisons, and local officials. At the same time, interethnic violence flared, with Russian settlers suffering reprisals as Kyrgyz and Kazakh rebels fought to reclaim their land and dignity.

The Russian response was swift and brutal. Tens of thousands of soldiers, including Cossack units, were diverted from the war front to suppress the rebellion. The Russian army waged a merciless campaign, burning villages, massacring civilians, and pushing many rebels and their families into the mountains. In the Tian Shan range, thousands perished as Kyrgyz and Kazakh families attempted to flee to China, succumbing to the harsh conditions of mountain passes.

The revolt left catastrophic losses in its wake. Estimates suggest between 100,000 to 500,000 Central Asians—primarily Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks—died from violence, starvation, or disease. The destruction of villages and irrigation canals further decimated the agricultural livelihoods of Central Asia, transforming once-thriving regions into barren deserts.

Though suppressed by early 1917, the revolt laid bare the fragility of Russian rule in Central Asia and the deep-seated resentment among its indigenous populations. The tragic exodus, known as Urkun in Kyrgyzstan, remains a central episode in the modern histories of Central Asian peoples, symbolizing both the devastating consequences of colonial policies and the resilience of those who resisted.

The Bolshevik revolutions of 1917—the February and October uprisings—provided the Jadidist reformers and other Muslim leaders in Central Asia with both an opportunity and a challenge. The February Revolution dismantled Tsarist authority, and in cities like Tashkent, provisional governments arose alongside Bolshevik Soviets, dominated by Russian workers and soldiers. Yet, these new political entities excluded the Muslim majority, deepening resentment and spurring calls for autonomy.

The Kokand Autonomous Government was declared in late 1917 in the Ferghana Valley as an attempt to secure self-rule. Led by a coalition of Jadidists and conservative ulema, it sought to form a federated state under Sharia law. However, this government was militarily weak and faced hostility from the Tashkent Soviet. In February 1918, the Red Army attacked Kokand, massacring up to 25,000 people and destroying the city. This brutality fueled widespread outrage and marked the start of the Basmachi revolt, a prolonged guerrilla insurgency against Soviet control.

The fall of Kokand and the ensuing violence spread resistance throughout Central Asia. In Bukhara and Khiva, traditional power structures also came under assault. In 1920, the Emir of Bukhara was overthrown by Red Army forces supported by the Young Bukharans, a leftist faction led by Fayzulla Khodzhayev. Similarly, in Khiva, the Young Khivans briefly held power before being ousted by Junaid Khan, who aligned with the Basmachi.

The Basmachi movement initially gained strength as various factions—clergy, tribal leaders, and disillusioned peasants—joined forces to resist Soviet rule. Figures like Irgash Bey in Ferghana and Ibrahim Bey in Bukhara organized armed resistance, rallying their followers under religious and nationalist slogans. The Soviets, facing internal instability and war, struggled to contain the rebellion.

A major turning point came in 1921 when Enver Pasha, the former Ottoman war minister, arrived in Central Asia. Defecting from his earlier Soviet allegiance, Enver sought to unify the Basmachi movement under a pan-Turkic banner. He revitalized the rebellion, transforming scattered guerrilla bands into an organized force that briefly recaptured significant territory, including parts of Bukhara and Samarkand. However, Soviet military pressure, combined with air power and political concessions—such as reinstating elements of Sharia law and waqf lands—gradually eroded the Basmachi's support. Enver's death in 1922 during a cavalry charge near Baldzhuan dealt the movement a final blow.

By the mid-1920s, the Basmachi revolt had largely collapsed. Peasants, weary of war, began to accept Soviet authority, particularly after Lenin's New Economic Policy provided temporary economic relief. Leaders like Fayzulla Khodzhayev emerged as prominent figures in the new Soviet administration, while others fled into exile. Although sporadic resistance persisted in remote areas, the Soviet Union had effectively secured its control over Central Asia, ending the region's brief experiments with autonomy and rebellion.

The borders of political units in Central Asia were redrawn along ethnic lines under the direction of Joseph Stalin, who served as Vladimir Lenin's Commissar for Nationalities. In 1924, the Soviet Union officially formed the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic (Uzbek SSR), combining the territories of present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. By 1929, Tajikistan became a separate Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. During this period, the Central Asian communists, including Khojayev, pushed Soviet reforms aimed at transforming society. Policies emphasized women’s emancipation, land redistribution, and mass literacy campaigns to reshape traditional structures.

However, the cooperative relationship between local leaders and the Soviet regime ended violently. In the late 1930s, during Stalin’s Great Purge, Khojayev and the entire Uzbek leadership were executed. They were replaced by Russian officials, marking the start of a Russification campaign. This period saw the increasing dominance of Russian political and economic influence in Uzbekistan, which would persist for decades.

During World War II, Stalin deepened this process by exiling entire ethnic groups—such as the Crimean Tatars and Caucasian peoples—to Uzbekistan. Officially, this was to prevent their alleged “subversive” activities against the Soviet war effort, but it further entrenched the Soviet reshaping of Uzbekistan’s demographic and cultural landscape.

The Hujum was a Soviet campaign launched on March 8, 1927, to liberate Central Asian women, particularly in Uzbekistan, by abolishing practices like veiling, seclusion, and other patriarchal traditions. Initiated by the Communist Party under Stalinist policies, the campaign aimed to dismantle gender inequality and integrate women into public life, education, and employment as part of the broader socialist transformation of society.

Pre-Soviet Traditions

Before Soviet rule, veiling in Central Asia was primarily practiced by settled Uzbeks and Tajiks, while nomadic Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen women used lighter veils like the yashmak. Veiling, tied to notions of family honor and religious piety, was enforced more rigidly among wealthier urban women who practiced seclusion. The Jadidist reformers had earlier advocated for women's education, laying a foundation for future campaigns but falling short of addressing veiling comprehensively.

Soviet Motivations and Launch

The Soviets viewed women’s liberation as critical to the construction of socialism. The Zhenotdel (Women's Division) spearheaded the campaign, organizing mass public unveilings and encouraging women to join schools and workplaces. It was promoted as an act of individual emancipation but was accompanied by coercion, as local Communist Party members and their families were the first required to unveil.

Uzbek Reactions and Resistance

The campaign sparked widespread resistance. For many Uzbeks, the veil became a symbol of cultural identity and defiance against Soviet intrusion. Islamic clergy denounced unveiling, and communities often attacked women who participated. Women faced immense societal pressure and violence, with thousands reportedly killed by their own communities, reinforcing male dominance.

Outcomes and Impact

Despite fierce resistance, the Hujum achieved some long-term goals. By the 1950s, the paranji veil had largely disappeared, replaced by simpler head coverings. Women's literacy rates rose dramatically, and female employment in collective farms surged. Health care and education systems expanded under Soviet rule, improving living conditions. However, while the campaign transformed women's public roles, traditional gender norms within the household persisted.

The Hujum remains a complex legacy—symbolizing both the Soviet push for modernization and the disruption of indigenous cultural practices.

In 1928, the Soviet government launched a massive campaign of collectivization in Central Asia, forcing farmers to pool their land, livestock, and equipment into state-controlled collective farms (kolkhozes) and state farms (sovkhozes). This policy aimed to centralize agriculture, increase grain and cotton production, and facilitate state control over rural economies. For Central Asian communities, where traditional systems of land ownership and kin-based farming had long prevailed, collectivization represented a drastic upheaval.

The process was met with resistance, as many Central Asians, including Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Turkmens, viewed collectivization as an attack on their way of life. The forced seizure of land, livestock, and crops disrupted local economies and caused resentment among the populace. This resistance, coupled with the coercive policies of the Soviet regime, led to widespread hardship. Livestock herds were decimated as many herders slaughtered animals rather than surrender them to the state, and food shortages became common.

The collectivization process was particularly devastating for nomadic pastoralists, such as the Kazakhs, whose livelihoods depended on the mobility of their herds. Forced sedentarization and collectivization resulted in famine, which wiped out a significant portion of the Kazakh population. For the Uzbeks and Tajiks, the emphasis on cotton production during collectivization further disrupted local food supplies, as arable land was increasingly devoted to monoculture for the Soviet industrial economy.

By the late 1930s, collectivization had fundamentally altered Central Asian agriculture. Traditional land ownership had been abolished, and state control over farming was firmly established. The region's farmers were integrated into the Soviet system, producing crops—particularly cotton—on collective farms under strict state quotas. While this process helped fulfill Soviet economic goals, it came at an immense social and human cost, leaving a legacy of resentment and hardship across Central Asia.

During the Great Purge of 1937–38, a brutal campaign of political repression initiated by Joseph Stalin, Uzbekistan's leadership was deeply affected. Many prominent figures, including alleged nationalists, were arrested, accused of disloyalty, and executed. Among them was Faizullah Khojaev, the first prime minister of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Khojaev, once a leading figure of the Jadidist reform movement and instrumental in the Sovietization of Bukhara and Khiva, fell victim to Stalin's purges as the regime targeted perceived dissent and local elites. His execution symbolized the dismantling of the indigenous leadership in Uzbekistan, further consolidating Moscow's control over the republic.

During World War II, Uzbekistan underwent massive demographic changes as a result of industrial relocation and forced resettlement policies. As Nazi Germany advanced on the western regions of the Soviet Union, entire industries were moved to safer locations in Central Asia, particularly Uzbekistan. Along with factories came large numbers of Russians, Ukrainians, and other nationalities, permanently altering the republic’s ethnic makeup.

In addition to industrial migration, Stalin’s deportation policies further transformed Uzbekistan’s demographics. Accusing several ethnic groups of collaboration with the Axis powers, Stalin forcibly relocated entire populations to remote areas of the Soviet Union, including Uzbekistan. Among the deported were ethnic Koreans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, and other groups. These displaced communities were settled in Uzbekistan’s cities and rural areas, where they often faced harsh living conditions and discrimination.

The combination of industrial relocation and forced resettlement created a significant demographic shift, integrating diverse populations into Uzbekistan’s social fabric while exacerbating local tensions and resource competition.

Following Joseph Stalin's death in 1953, the rule of Nikita Khrushchev ushered in a period of relative relaxation in Uzbekistan. Khrushchev's policies allowed for the rehabilitation of some previously purged Uzbek nationalists, and more Uzbeks began to join the Communist Party and take positions in government. However, participation in this system came on Russian terms: Russian was the language of administration, and Russification was essential for career advancement. Uzbeks who retained traditional lifestyles and identities were largely excluded from leadership roles. These conditions reinforced Uzbekistan's reputation as one of the most politically conservative republics in the Soviet Union.

Under Khrushchev and his successor Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982), regional and clan-based networks among Uzbeks gained influence, often providing connections between state positions and informal support systems. This trend was particularly pronounced during the leadership of Sharaf Rashidov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan from 1959 to 1982. Rashidov filled party and government positions with his relatives and associates from his native region, creating personal networks of loyalty that allowed these elites to treat their posts as sources of personal enrichment.

Rashidov’s strategy to appease Moscow while strengthening Uzbekistan's autonomy was notable. By maintaining a loyal relationship with Brezhnev and using bribes to gain favor with Soviet officials, Rashidov ensured Uzbekistan’s ability to manipulate cotton production quotas. Moscow’s increasing demands for cotton were met on paper, but in reality, the Uzbek government often falsified reports and feigned compliance. Rashidov's tenure epitomized both the growth of unofficial patronage networks and the republic’s attempts to navigate Moscow’s control while pursuing its own interests.

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union launched a drive to massively expand cotton production in Uzbekistan, branding it the “white gold” of the Soviet economy. To achieve this, the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers—key sources of water for the Aral Sea—were diverted to irrigate desert land for cotton cultivation, rice, melons, and cereals. Initially, this policy seemed successful: by 1988, Uzbekistan became the world’s largest exporter of cotton, and cotton production remained the country’s main cash crop for decades.

However, the large-scale irrigation projects that enabled this expansion were poorly executed. The Qaraqum Canal, the largest irrigation channel in Central Asia, suffered from massive water loss due to leakage and evaporation—up to 75% of its flow was wasted. By 2012, only 12% of Uzbekistan’s irrigation canals were waterproofed, and the majority of irrigation channels lacked proper anti-infiltration linings and flow gauges.

As a result of these overzealous water withdrawals, the Aral Sea began to shrink at an alarming rate. Between 1961 and 1970, the sea level fell by 20 cm per year, but this rate nearly tripled in the 1970s and doubled again in the 1980s, reaching 80–90 cm per year. The dramatic decline continued into the 2000s, with the sea level dropping from 53 meters above sea level in the early 20th century to just 27 meters by 2010 in the larger Aral Sea.

Animated map of the shrinking of the Aral Sea. © NordNordWest

The shrinking of the Aral Sea was anticipated by Soviet planners. By 1964, experts at the Hydroproject Institute openly acknowledged that the Aral Sea was doomed, yet the irrigation projects continued. Soviet authorities dismissed the ecological consequences, with some even referring to the Aral Sea as “nature’s error”, implying its evaporation was inevitable. Alternative proposals, such as redirecting rivers from Siberia to refill the sea, were briefly considered but abandoned by the mid-1980s due to staggering costs and public opposition in Russia.

The resulting ecological disaster devastated the region. The shrinking sea led to severe environmental damage, desertification, loss of fisheries, and widespread health problems for the surrounding populations, while increasing dissatisfaction with Soviet policies in Central Asia.

By the 1970s, Moscow’s grip on Uzbekistan began to weaken as Sharaf Rashidov, the long-serving Uzbek party leader, brought relatives and loyalists into key positions, creating an entrenched system of corruption. After Rashidov's death in 1983, Moscow sought to reassert control. The mid-1980s saw sweeping purges under Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership, with Uzbek officials accused of falsifying cotton production figures in what became known as the "cotton scandal." The trials exposed deep corruption and implicated figures as high as Yuri Churbanov, Brezhnev’s son-in-law, tarnishing Uzbekistan's reputation across the Soviet Union. However, the purges only fueled resentment and amplified Uzbek nationalism, with many viewing the campaign as unfair targeting by the central government.

During this period, grievances against Moscow’s policies, particularly the focus on cotton monoculture and suppression of Islamic traditions, gained momentum. By the late 1980s, the liberalized atmosphere of Gorbachev’s reforms under glasnost and perestroika allowed dissent to emerge more openly. Environmental devastation, particularly the drying of the Aral Sea, and economic neglect further stirred discontent. Resentment also grew over discrimination faced by Uzbek recruits in the Soviet army and the lack of industrial investment needed to create jobs for the republic's burgeoning population.

Ethnic tensions erupted violently in 1989 and 1990, particularly in the Fergana Valley, where Uzbeks attacked Meskhetian Turks, and in the Kyrgyz city of Osh, where Uzbek and Kyrgyz youths clashed. In response, Moscow scaled back its purges and appointed Islam Karimov, an ethnic Uzbek outsider, as the first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan. This move aimed to pacify tensions and reduce local opposition.

Despite these efforts, Uzbek dissatisfaction persisted. Political movements like Birlik (Unity) emerged, initially focusing on agricultural reform, rescuing the Aral Sea, and advocating for the Uzbek language as the state language. Though they symbolized a broader desire for change, movements like Birlik struggled to gain widespread rural support, as many Uzbeks, particularly outside the cities, remained loyal to the government.

Karimov’s rise to leadership proved pivotal. When Uzbekistan reluctantly approved independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Karimov emerged as president, ushering in a new era of Uzbek governance.

The Fergana Massacre of June 1989 marked a tragic outbreak of ethnic violence in the Fergana Valley of the Uzbek SSR. The conflict erupted between the native Uzbek population and the Meskhetian Turks, an ethnic group exiled to Central Asia during World War II by Stalin. Long-held tensions, exacerbated by economic competition and growing Uzbek nationalism, boiled over into violent riots. Uzbek mobs targeted the Meskhetian Turks, leading to the deaths of at least 97 people, injuries to over 1,000, and the destruction of hundreds of homes and properties.

Though official Soviet sources attributed the violence to mafia elements or political agitation against Gorbachev's reforms, the massacre highlighted deep-rooted ethnic grievances and societal strains in the late Soviet Union. The violence also spread to some Bukharan Jews living in the region, prompting many to flee to Israel.

The aftermath of the massacre saw a mass exodus of the Meskhetian Turks from Uzbekistan. Approximately 70,000 relocated to Azerbaijan, while others sought refuge in Russia's Krasnodar Krai, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. The events in Fergana foreshadowed the broader ethnic and political instability that accompanied the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Under Islam Karimov's leadership, Uzbekistan transitioned into an independent state following the collapse of the Soviet Union but quickly became an authoritarian regime. Karimov consolidated power through tightly controlled elections and constitutional amendments, extending his presidency through referenda criticized for being neither free nor fair. By suppressing opposition and heavily regulating political activity, Karimov ensured his rule remained unchallenged.

Karimov's government also adopted strict policies against Islamist movements, particularly after incidents like the 1999 assassination attempt and growing fears of extremism. Organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir were officially designated as terrorist groups by the Uzbek government, with their leaders sentenced in absentia or targeted militarily. This approach intensified after Uzbekistan became a United States ally in the War on Terror following the September 11 attacks, hosting U.S. military bases to support operations in Afghanistan.

However, Karimov's heavy-handed tactics, including widespread human rights abuses, censorship, and allegations of torture, drew international criticism. Events such as the 2005 Andijan massacre, where government troops opened fire on protestors, further isolated Uzbekistan diplomatically. Relations with Western countries deteriorated, leading to the expulsion of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan in 2005.

Domestically, Karimov suppressed religious freedoms, banned the public call to prayer, and targeted displays of Islamic practice perceived as extremist. While he maintained political stability, his rule was marked by severe restrictions on civil liberties and a lack of democratic reforms. Following his death in 2016, his successor, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, began to reverse some of Karimov's more repressive policies.

The August 1991 coup attempt by hard-line communists in Moscow served as a catalyst for independence movements across the Soviet Union. While initially hesitant to oppose the coup, Uzbekistan declared independence on August 31, 1991, after the events accelerated its path toward sovereignty. In December, a referendum solidified public support for independence, with 98.2% of the population voting in favor. Shortly afterward, elections were held, and Islam Karimov was chosen as Uzbekistan’s first president.

Although independence was not actively sought, Karimov and his government quickly adapted to the new reality. The collapse of the Soviet Union—and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States—meant Uzbekistan could no longer rely on subsidies and centralized economic structures. New markets, economic systems, and foreign partnerships needed to be forged. For the first time in its modern history, Uzbekistan had to establish independent foreign relations, attract investments, and seek international recognition.

However, Uzbekistan’s political landscape complicated its economic ambitions. The government’s suppression of internal dissent in 1992 and 1993 drew criticism from the West, leading to hesitancy around foreign investment and financial aid. This dual perception—Uzbekistan as both a stable investment opportunity and a repressive post-Soviet regime—shaped its early years as an independent state. Balancing economic development with political stability remained a central challenge for the fledgling republic in its first five years.

On February 16, 1999, a series of six car bombings struck Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, in what appeared to be a coordinated and highly calculated attack. The explosions targeted prominent government buildings and caused panic across the city. Over the course of about an hour and a half, the blasts killed 16 people and injured more than 120 others. While the exact sequence of the attacks remains unclear, the final explosion seemed to be the most significant, allegedly part of an assassination attempt on President Islam Karimov.

The official government narrative claimed that Islamic militants, particularly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), were responsible for the bombings. According to this version, the attackers employed powerful car bombs and had received training in Chechnya under commanders like Khattab and Shamil Basayev. However, this explanation has faced significant scrutiny. Critics suggested alternative perpetrators, ranging from rival political factions and “clans” within Uzbekistan’s power structure to the possible involvement of neighboring Tajikistan, where militants may have retaliated for Uzbekistan's interference in the Tajik Civil War. Some even posited that internal forces within the Uzbek government, such as the National Security Service (SNB), could have staged the attacks to justify increased repression.

The aftermath of the bombings was marked by a severe government crackdown. Within hours, Karimov declared Islamic militants responsible and launched a wave of arrests that reportedly swept up thousands of individuals. Estimates suggest that up to 5,000 people were detained, many of whom were accused of complicity with extremist groups. Human rights organizations condemned the government’s response, alleging the widespread use of torture and fabricated evidence to secure confessions.

The bombings ultimately served as a turning point in Karimov's rule. They provided a pretext for tightening control over religious expression, cracking down on Islamic organizations, and silencing dissent more broadly. The notorious Jaslyk Prison was opened shortly after, becoming a symbol of the regime's harsh treatment of alleged extremists. While the official explanation placed blame on external forces and the IMU, the true nature of the Tashkent bombings remains unresolved, with speculation continuing about the involvement of rival political factions or deeper conspiracies within the Uzbek state.

The Andijan Massacre of 13 May 2005 in Uzbekistan marked a violent suppression of protests by the Uzbek government. The incident occurred in Andijan, located in the Fergana Valley, and escalated after a prison break freed local businessmen accused of "extremism" and of belonging to the banned group Akromiya. Protesters initially gathered to voice economic grievances, government corruption, and dissatisfaction with the regime of President Islam Karimov.

The situation turned deadly when troops from the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB) and military opened fire on civilians gathered in the city's Babur Square. Estimates of those killed vary significantly: the Uzbek government reported 187 deaths, while human rights groups and eyewitnesses claimed hundreds were killed, with some estimates reaching 1,500 casualties. The Uzbek government blamed Islamic extremist groups for organizing the unrest, while critics argued that this was a pretext to justify repressive policies.

Eyewitness accounts reported indiscriminate firing on unarmed civilians, including women and children. Some alleged that wounded protesters were systematically executed, and many bodies were buried in mass graves to conceal the true death toll. Journalists and human rights organizations were heavily restricted in covering the aftermath, and several were forced into exile.

The massacre drew international condemnation, leading to strained relations between Uzbekistan and Western governments, particularly the United States, which had maintained a military base in Uzbekistan. In response to international calls for an independent investigation, Uzbekistan closed the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base to U.S. forces and aligned more closely with Russia and China. The Andijan Massacre remains a defining moment in Uzbekistan's modern history, symbolizing the severe repression of dissent under Karimov's regime.

Shavkat Mirziyoyev's presidency began on December 14, 2016, following a decisive victory in the presidential election with 88.6% of the vote. Mirziyoyev, a long-time insider of Uzbek politics who served as prime minister under Islam Karimov for 13 years, came to power during a critical moment of transition. His rise to leadership brought with it promises of reform and a departure from the rigid policies of his predecessor. The inauguration ceremony in the Supreme Assembly, where he swore his oath with his hand on the Constitution and the Quran, signified the formal start of his leadership.

In the early years of his presidency, Mirziyoyev sought to consolidate his power by reshaping Uzbekistan's political landscape. He strategically distanced himself from Karimov’s legacy, removing influential officials seen as obstacles to his reforms. Key figures like Rustam Azimov and Rustam Inoyatov, known for their alignment with the old order, were sidelined, allowing Mirziyoyev to neutralize political opposition and assert control. The defense ministry also underwent changes, with Mirziyoyev appointing new leadership to reflect his vision of a modernized and loyal administration. These early steps allowed him to establish a firmer grip over Uzbekistan's government, free from the power struggles that had characterized his predecessor’s rule.

On the economic front, Mirziyoyev pursued modernization with urgency. His government championed ambitious reforms aimed at revitalizing Uzbekistan’s economy, prioritizing job creation, increased exports, and attracting foreign investment. The results were visible, with more than 300,000 jobs created and significant economic partnerships secured. Talks with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE in 2019 resulted in $10 billion in investments directed toward infrastructure, energy, and agriculture. Privatization also gained momentum, with the approval of plans to sell state-owned enterprises to the Uzbek private sector as part of a broader strategy to stimulate economic growth.

Mirziyoyev also focused on strengthening the military and expanding educational opportunities within the armed forces. He oversaw the reform and establishment of military institutions like the Military Medical Academy and the Higher Military Aviation School, reflecting his commitment to modernizing Uzbekistan’s defense infrastructure. At the same time, a defense industry committee was established to centralize the management of military resources. These measures aimed to build a professional, well-equipped armed force capable of protecting Uzbekistan’s security interests.

The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 posed a significant test for Mirziyoyev’s leadership. His administration imposed strict lockdown measures to control the spread of the virus while launching initiatives to revive critical sectors like tourism. The “Safe Travel Guaranteed” campaign, for instance, offered compensation to tourists who contracted the virus, encouraging the return of travelers to Uzbekistan. Mirziyoyev did not hesitate to reprimand officials, including the health minister and Tashkent’s mayor, for their failures in handling the crisis. He also honored healthcare workers for their efforts, striking a balance between accountability and recognition.

The presidency faced serious challenges in 2022 when protests erupted in Karakalpakstan. Proposed amendments to the constitution that threatened Karakalpakstan's autonomy led to violent unrest. The protests were harshly suppressed, resulting in 18 deaths and raising concerns over the government’s approach to dissent.

Mirziyoyev’s foreign policy marked a stark departure from Karimov’s isolationism. He prioritized regional cooperation and worked to rebuild ties with Uzbekistan’s neighbors, particularly Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. His state visit to Kyrgyzstan in 2017 was the first in nearly two decades, signaling a thaw in long-frozen relations. A similar breakthrough occurred in 2018 when Mirziyoyev traveled to Tajikistan, leading to the resumption of flights between Tashkent and Dushanbe for the first time in 25 years. These efforts addressed longstanding border disputes and fostered economic collaboration, transforming Uzbekistan into a more engaged regional player.

Beyond Central Asia, Mirziyoyev cultivated closer ties with global powers. His presidency welcomed state visits from leaders such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Narendra Modi, highlighting Uzbekistan's growing role in international affairs. Under his leadership, Uzbekistan assumed the presidency of the CIS Council of Heads of State for the first time in 2020, a notable achievement in regional diplomacy.

Mirziyoyev also positioned Uzbekistan as a mediator in Afghanistan. He facilitated peace talks and hosted Taliban delegations in Tashkent, offering Uzbekistan’s support for stabilizing Afghanistan’s economy and political situation. His efforts to address terrorism extended beyond borders, as seen in Operation Mehr, a program launched to repatriate Uzbek citizens—primarily women and children—from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.

The shift in Uzbekistan’s leadership under Mirziyoyev brought significant change, but challenges persisted. While his economic and diplomatic reforms marked progress, issues such as the Karakalpakstan protests and lingering concerns over political freedoms underscored the delicate balance he sought to maintain. By the time Mirziyoyev secured his re-election in 2023, Uzbekistan stood at a crossroads: a nation striving for modernization while grappling with the weight of its past. His presidency, marked by both transformation and tension, continued to shape the trajectory of post-Soviet Uzbekistan.